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# STUDY PROJECT

## LEADERSHIP IN PEACE AND WAR: ARE THERE DIFFERENCES? AND THE IMPACT ON LEADER DEVELOPMENT

BY

LIEUTENANT COLONEL RICHARD H. GORING, EN

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the second part of the paper. Current and projected cuts in the military are going to place a premium on good leaders in the future. The second part of the paper looks at what is required of senior leaders in order to prepare their subordinates for the challenges that will face them. The final conclusions are drawn and looked at in conjunction with the effects of a dwindling population of combat veterans.

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LEADERSHIP IN PEACE AND WAR: ARE THERE DIFFERENCES?  
AND THE IMPACT ON LEADER DEVELOPMENT

AN INDIVIDUAL STUDY PROJECT

by

LIEUTENANT COLONEL RICHARD H. GORING, EN

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LEADERSHIP IN PEACE AND WAR:  
ARE THERE DIFFERENCES?  
AND THE IMPACT ON LEADER DEVELOPMENT

CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

The purpose of this paper is twofold. The first is to determine if there is a difference in leadership in war and peace. If there is a difference, which aspects of wartime leadership should be emphasized in peace to prepare for war. A second purpose is to examine the role of senior leaders in the development of subordinates in order to determine what role they can best play in preparing junior leaders for war. I also had a more personal reason for undertaking this study and that was to help me understand what makes combat leaders function the way they do and how I could impart this knowledge to my subordinates. My goal is to ensure we best take care of the Army's most precious resource: soldiers.

Chapter II begins the process by examining leadership requirements dictated by current Army doctrine and leadership manuals. Particular attention will be paid to what is required by the Air Land Battle as this is the way we are currently prepared to fight. With "peace" breaking out in Europe now, Low Intensity

Conflict will be particularly looked at to see if it provides any new requirements.

Chapter III addresses the basic question: Is there really a difference between leadership in war and peacetime? This chapter is the basis for the remainder of the paper and as such, is an extremely important one.

In Chapter IV there is a discussion of what I observed in the field regarding leadership. The question: Can the bold leader survive today? will be addressed here. I also provide a compilation of informal discussions with a small number of my fellow War College students on their experiences in the field.

Chapter V looks at how senior leaders can effect future leaders. The pertinent parts of FM 22-103 and DA PAM 600-80 are discussed to provide the framework senior leaders must work from. General Bruce C. Clarke's thirteen points on "What Junior Level Leaders Have a Right to Expect from Senior Level Leaders" closes out this chapter.

The final chapter, Chapter VI, links the previous ones and looks at the effects of a dwindling population of combat veterans. The final conclusions are also found here.

The overall purpose of this paper is not to give the Army's current and future leaders a cookbook answer to what I feel is a very complex problem. It is to provoke thought on my part and the part of anyone who reads it.



ENDNOTE

1. U.S. Department of the Army, Field Manual 22-103, Inside cover (hereafter referred to as "FM 22-103").

## CHAPTER II

### DOCTRINAL ASPECTS OF LEADERSHIP

Before any determination can be made regarding differences between leadership in peace and war it becomes important to understand the basics of leadership. This chapter will review and discuss leadership in terms of the traits and characteristics required of a leader. These traits and characteristics go across all levels of leadership; from the direct to the executive level. A knowledge of this will also aid in the discussion that follows in Chapter IV on how senior leaders can effect leadership.

Leadership is the cornerstone of the military. The Army has spent countless hours and dollars in teaching this subject to soldiers. Throughout the Army's professional schools you find a significant portion of the curriculum is leadership and preparing soldiers to assume leadership positions. The result of a soldier's attendance should be that he or she is ready for that challenge of leadership during peace or war. Before delving into the aspects of combat leadership that need to be emphasized, leadership itself must be discussed.

There are many definitions of leadership, each directed toward a different element of society. The first definition of leadership comes from Webster's Dictionary and defines leadership as:

"The office or position of a leader. The qualities of a leader: capacity to lead."<sup>1</sup>

This definition only touches the surface of what this paper examines. The second sentence gives a suggestion of what will come.

FM 22-100 entitled: "Military Leadership," provides more specific information in its definition of military leadership:

"Military leadership is a process by which a soldier influences others to accomplish the mission. A soldier carries out this process by applying his leadership attributes (beliefs, values, ethics, character, knowledge and skills)."<sup>2</sup>

Looking at this definition, leadership attributes can be summarized as: "be, know and do."<sup>3</sup> From the "be" group a leader must have the following character traits which are key to success: courage, competence, candor and commitment. Under the overall "know" group, being technically and tactically proficient comes to the forefront. Before reviewing the doctrine of Airland Battle and Low Intensity Conflict for their leadership requirements, the elements of "BE AND KNOW" must be understood.

The four "C's" of character traits are extremely important to any leader. A leader lacking one or more of these character traits may still be effective. Conversely, he may also lead soldiers to a disastrous end! Courage comes in two dimensions: physical and moral. "Physical courage is overcoming fears of bodily harm and doing your duty."<sup>4</sup> Moral courage is defined as "overcoming fears of other than bodily harm, while doing what ought to be done."<sup>5</sup> Courage is critical for any leader. Without it he will be unable to inspire his men to perform and make the sacrifices to accomplish the mission. Candor provides both superiors and subordinates a look into the very soul of the leader. From this they draw their conclusions of what type of man he is. Is he trustworthy? Will he be followed with confidence? A leader must have competence to be

able to train and develop his men individually and collectively to perform their missions. Finally comes commitment, meaning one's dedication to his unit, its missions and the country. Here too this attribute can have a telling effect on mission accomplishment when a leader is successful in instilling commitment in his men and unit.

Being technically and tactically proficient, as previously mentioned, stands out as one of the more obvious and critical elements under the "know" group. Years of each soldier's career are spent in pursuit of being proficient in his job. Leaders desiring this proficiency must devote extra time and study to reach this plateau and remain there while weapons and doctrine are constantly changing. Those who fail to continue this quest for knowledge will have subordinate leaders and soldiers who may not be totally ready for what can face them on the next battlefield. An additional reality of this issue is that soldiers will see the lack of proficiency in their leaders and lose confidence in their ability to keep them alive. The result of this lack of confidence can be a very tentative and a most unproductive unit.

After examining some of the basics of leadership, it now becomes key to determine what our current warfighting doctrine demands of leaders. "FM 100-5, "Operations" is the basic bible for warfighting by Army forces. It covers the spectrum from High to Low-Intensity Conflict. Chapter I outlines the challenges facing the Army across the spectrum and discusses how to meet them. The

section entitled Leadership and Soldiers makes the following comments:

"Wars are fought and won by men, not by machines. The human dimensions of war will be decisive in the campaigns and battles of the future just as it has been in the past. The fluid, compartmented nature of war will place a premium on sound leadership, competent and courageous soldiers, and cohesive, well-trained units. The conditions of combat on the next battlefield will be unforgiving of errors and will demand great skill, imagination, and flexibility of leaders. As in the wars of the past, however, American soldiers will fight resolutely when they know and respect their leaders and believe that they are part of a good unit ..."<sup>6</sup> (underlining in the quote is mine).

Here we notice that great skill, imagination and flexibility will be key to the successes of leaders. In chapter 2 of FM 100-5, under the heading of "Dynamics of Combat Power," leadership is again discussed. Portions of the discussion have a clear impact on this paper:

"The most essential element of combat power is competent and confident leadership. Leadership provides purpose, direction, and motivation in combat. ... Only excellence in the art and science of war will enable the commander to generate and apply combat power successfully. Thus, no peacetime duty is more important for leaders that studying their profession and preparing for war. ..."<sup>7</sup>

The leader who will be the most effective will be competent and exhibit confidence while performing his tasks. He will also have studied his profession to become proficient in the art of war and maintain that proficiency.

The basic tenets of the Airland Battle doctrine will further define the doctrinal leadership requirements and continue to help develop and refine the requirements for a successful warrior leader. The four tenets are: "initiative, agility, depth and

synchronization."<sup>3</sup> Retaining the initiative in battle means that you always clearly define the terms of that battle by your actions. Never let the enemy recover or gain the advantage. This can be difficult to do and requires a bold and audacious leader, one who is willing to take risks to accomplish the mission. Agility, on the other hand, requires well-trained leaders and units who can act faster than the enemy to seize or hold the initiative. The leader capable of agility will be competent, bold, and daring, as well as tactically proficient. A commander must view the battlefield in depth. He brings his operations together in light of space, time and resources to gain the momentum from the enemy. He will also fight the enemy through the entire depth of their forces, attacking not only their first echelons but their flanks, rear and support elements as well. The leader who is able to properly exploit depth in operations will demonstrate boldness, foresight, imagination and decisiveness. Synchronization requires the leader to bring together all elements of combat power at the decisive point. This is an important tenet which, to accomplish, requires exceptional skill by the leader.

FM 100-20 Low-Intensity Conflict (Final Draft) addresses some other aspects of leadership that have not before been raised in this paper. Besides his normal responsibilities in a LIC environment, the leader must consider the effects that his unit's actions may have on public opinion. A successful tactical operation may, in the execution thereof, have a disastrous effect on the people being supported. Each leader must ensure the

commander's intent, as well as his vision, are clearly understood at lower levels. Opportunities for improper actions to occur are severely limited if this is accomplished. If the military leader in a LIC environment has to work with embassy and other government agencies as a member of the country team, then he must also be capable of working in a political situation. He will not be in charge, and must be able to influence others based on the facts he presents and his communicative skills. The LIC environment has contributed two more aspects of a leader to those previously identified. They are the ability to communicate and the ability to compromise and work in a political environment.

My review of the current doctrine on leadership and warfighting portrays the ideal leader as possessing the following thirteen elements of leadership: physically fit, bold, courageous, decisive, technically and tactically proficient, innovative, risk taker, flexible, caring, candid and committed to his unit, Army and the nation, as well as the ability to communicate and to compromise. Who is this "super" soldier and does he really exist? There are a large number of leaders throughout our Army who exhibit these aspects of leadership in varying degrees. They may not possess all of them equally, but they demonstrate enough to be successful leaders in combat. History is replete with their names, as it is of those who only pretended to be leaders and were failures.

John M. Vermillion, in his article: "The Pillars of Generalship," makes a very interesting statement about personal

attributes of a leader which is also an appropriate close to this chapter:

"The problem with so much emphasis on personal qualities is that even if the key ones could be identified, a leader probably cannot adhere to them all at the same time or all of the time. Let us also recall that those commonly acclaimed as "great" leaders are not necessarily good men. It is possible to be morally blemished and still be a highly effective combat commander."

#### ENDNOTES

1. "Leadership," Webster's Third New International Dictionary of the English Language, p. 1283.
2. U.S. Department of the Army, Field Manual 22-100, p. 44 (hereafter referred to as "FM 22-100").
3. Ibid., p. 49.
4. Ibid., p. 90.
5. Ibid.
6. U.S. Department of the Army, Field Manual 100-5, pp. 5-6 (hereafter referred to as "FM 100-5").
7. Ibid., pp. 13-14.
8. Ibid., p. 15.
9. John M. Vermillion, "The Pillars of Generalship," The Challenge of Military Leadership, p. 71.



## CHAPTER III

### IS THERE REALLY A DIFFERENCE BETWEEN LEADERSHIP IN WAR AND PEACE?

The answer to the question posed by the title of this chapter will, in my case, have to come from research rather than experience. Chapter II reviewed doctrinal aspects of leadership as well as some of the mechanics of leadership. This will be tied in with the differences found between war and peacetime environments.

In Book One of "On War," entitled: On the Nature of War, Clausewitz goes into what makes war different. In Chapter Four he discusses the danger in war. He devotes a considerable portion of the chapter to a description of a soldier's first baptism by fire. He describes in detail the changes that the soldier goes through internally and to those soldiers around him as bullets, cannonballs and shells strike nearby. His portrayal is remarkable and accurate. He states: "For a final shock, the sight of men being killed and mutilated moves our pounding hearts to awe and pity"<sup>1</sup> He further states: "Danger is a part of the friction of war. Without an accurate conception of danger we cannot understand war."<sup>2</sup> Danger in war, with its inherent results of injury and death, is one real difference between war and peace. The question is: Does danger cause a difference in leadership in war? The answer will come later in this chapter.

Clausewitz also addresses "friction in war" which he says is the ingredient that makes the simple seem difficult and the

difficult next to impossible. "Friction is the only concept that more or less corresponds to the factors that distinguish real war from war on paper."<sup>3</sup> Many elements make up friction: weather, terrain, lack of intelligence, as well as misplaced supplies and equipment. Exertion, fatigue and even panic are also elements of the friction and fog that accompany battles and affect the efforts of leaders and subordinates alike. When deciding if there is a difference between leadership in peace or war they cannot be overlooked. Can this ingredient of friction cause leadership to be different in war? Will it cause a leader to do something entirely different than he would in peacetime? The answer is yes. But, will there be a difference in the principles and aspects of leadership that apply at the time? I think not! The weight a leader may place on one fundamental may increase or decrease depending on the situation, but the basics remain the same. In an article in the Military Review in December, 1985, entitled: "Why Study Leadership?", LTC Louis Csoka makes the following statement:

"The artist paints a picture based on some inherent qualities coupled with the experiences of numerous paintings. This combination creates a unique style. No study, no new knowledge is going to alter the basic feeling for painting. It is an inherent part of the painter's essence ... However, studying art can enhance and expand the existing capabilities of the painter and lead to an even more enriched painting. This is not because it alters the essence of the painter, but because it embellishes and enlarges the capabilities that already exist ... And so it is with leadership. The art of leadership involves those qualities, beliefs and values that permit skillful influence over others. This is based more upon the essence of the individual than anything else. We can practice this art in varying degrees. The scientific study of leadership, however, provides a common conceptual framework which can equally enrich the leadership process for all."<sup>4</sup>

This quote agrees with my opinions. It simply states that leadership is an art which can be studied scientifically to enhance ones knowledge of the subject. Leadership, the art, can be practiced in varying degrees, but the basic essence remains the same.

Also in support of my position is a Research Report done at the Air War College in 1989 entitled: "Combat versus Noncombat Leadership" by Lieutenant Colonel Donald Watt, Jr. After reviewing what leadership is and discussing the essential qualities of a combat leader in several chapters, he makes the following statement in his analysis which firmly support my feelings.

"Having viewed leadership from the standpoint of both environments, there doesn't seem to be a significant difference in the leader's execution of his essential functions. Under combat conditions execution is far more difficult and the consequences of failure are far greater, but the process is essentially the same."<sup>5</sup>

In the conclusions in the same paper, LTC Watt states the following, which again supports my premise:

"The bottom line is that leadership is leadership whether combat or noncombat. Granted, in a combat environment, approaches and techniques may change as the leader adapts to greater levels of friction and uncertainty, but the duality of leadership must be present if success is to be had. That special combination of art and science which is the essence of real leadership is indispensable."<sup>6</sup>

Finally, I submit a portion of a previously used quote from FM 100-5, Chapter 1:

"The fluid, compartmented nature of war will place a premium on sound leadership, competent and courageous soldiers, and cohesive, well-trained units. The conditions of combat on the next battlefield will be unforgiving of errors and will demand great skill, imagination and flexibility of leaders."

In this quote, as in every document I read during the preparation of this paper, the authors spoke of leadership and did not differentiate between leadership in war and peace. In all cases, they simply discuss the requirements of leadership. The necessary traits and characteristics are for leadership in general, without any differentiation between combat and noncombat.

In an article based on a speech to the U.S. Army Command and Staff College on 19 May, 1966, General Ridgway made the following statement:

"These are some of the reasons why I hold that leadership is not a science, but an art. It conceives an ideal, states it as an objective, and then seeks actively and earnestly to attain it, everlastingly persevering, because the records of war are full of successes coming to those leaders who stuck it out just a little longer than their opponents."<sup>3</sup>

He then goes on to give suggestions for leadership which also reinforce what I have written in Chapter II.

"Read widely and wisely all the history and biography possible. Soak up all the personal experiences you can of battle-tested brother officers.

This broadens your understanding of an art of which you can never hope to know all.

Study thoughtfully the records of past successful leaders and adapt their methods to yours.

Work hard to keep fit. That little extra stamina may some day pull you out of some deep holes.

Work hard, in your own way, at being tops at your job.

Keep the three C's - character, courage, and competence - always before your mind, and with faith in God, be yourself.

Remember there are many others on your team, and be

inwardly humble. Every man's life is equally precious, although all are at the disposal of our country, and the contribution each makes in battle is of equal potential value."

The aspects of leadership mentioned in Chapter II will still apply, along with the character traits listed during war or peace. These are the blueprints for successful leaders and have been documented and covered over the years and wars. The Army has written field manuals on leadership to provide the outline for all to follow.

There is no difference in leadership in war or peace. Successful leaders still exhibit the same traits and characteristics in war or peace. The real difference is in the end result of poor leadership in war; the names of our soldiers carved in small stone tablets for all to see for eternity.

#### ENDNOTES

1. Karl Von Clausewitz, On War, p. 113.
2. Ibid., p. 114.
3. Ibid., p. 119.
4. Louis S. Csoka, "Why Study Leadership." Military Review, December 1985, p. 47.
5. Donald H. Watt Jr., LTC, Combat versus Noncombat Leadership. p. 35.
6. Ibid., p. 37.
7. FM 100-5, p. 5.
8. Matthew B. Ridgway, "Leadership," Military Review, October 1966, p. 49.
9. Ibid., p. 49.

## CHAPTER IV

### LEADERSHIP IN THE FIELD AS I SAW IT

Having determined there is no difference in leadership during war or peace, it becomes important to look at leadership as practiced in the field to determine how senior leaders can best develop subordinates for the first battle of the war. This chapter discusses my perceptions on leadership in the field today, using my battalion command tenure as the vehicle. During the discussion I will describe how one senior leader had an affect on both myself and my units' leaders to set the stage for Chapter V.

The basis for my observations come from twenty-five months as the Commander, 84th Engineer Battalion (Combat Heavy), 45th General Support Group, Schofield Barracks, Hawaii. The 45th Support Group provided the combat service support to the 25th Infantry Division (Light). Additionally, it provided topographic and engineering support throughout the Pacific for WESTCOM. My rater was the Commander of the 45th. My senior rater (rater for Commander 45th) was the Deputy Commanding General of WESTCOM (a major general). During my command tour I had two different raters, plus two senior raters. Each rater had his own philosophy about what was required of a commander. Comments about my observations are not criticisms of these soldiers, in fact, far from it. Perhaps they are criticisms of the system that we live and work under.

I was given much latitude in how I commanded my battalion. At first, I was given a set of parameters from which to work and

allowed to command with a minimum of supervision and interference. Each commander within the Group was strongly encouraged to be proficient, physically fit, flexible, caring and committed. The next battlefield will require many individual life and death battles, fought at platoon, company and battalion level. These smaller battles will be fought by leaders who will have to be bold, decisive, innovative and risk takers to be successful. Yet within the group, these were traits not encouraged, nor were they discouraged. They were in the grey area where one could enter, treading lightly, but only so far. An example of this concerned field problems. After recognizing that a Monday to Friday field problem took two weekends away from the soldiers, I decided to go to the field on Saturday and return Wednesday night. I realized this took the first weekend away from the soldiers, but once clean-up was accomplished the soldiers were off from Friday afternoon until the following Monday morning PT formation. I was directed not to do it again as the Group Commander thought this too bold and could generate complaints. The soldiers understood the rationale for the change, but my immediate superior did not. We regressed to a less efficient program. I was also criticized for the intensity of the FTX's. The companies were required to work twenty-four hours a day (something they are staffed and organized for by TOE) to accomplish the missions assigned. Company commanders were required to initiate and enforce sleep plans to be successful. The tempo was fast, but realistic, considering our primary contingency mission. Safety was repeatedly emphasized to me during my training

by my commander. When you have over 550 major end items of heavy construction equipment including bulldozers, scrapers and dump trucks, as well as an operational quarry, safety is paramount. Each soldier is a safety officer who can and did stop unsafe acts. When an accident occurred we held officer, NCO and soldier classes on the accident which included how it occurred. Yet, each accident brought another message to be more safety conscious.

As stated before, I was given almost full reign to conduct business as I saw fit, except for field problems over weekends. Yet, I felt there were other actions that were not to be attempted. This was conveyed through very subtle, and in some cases, not so subtle, gestures from the commander. Of the four people in my rating chain there was only one who clearly understood leadership and its requirements, my second senior rater. He was an infantryman, true soldier, warrior and a soldier's general. When he visited the unit, there were no long office briefings. Instead, he wanted to see what the battalion was doing and to know why. When he spoke to the soldiers his charisma captured them and they listened intently while he explained why we were doing the right things in preparing for war. In retrospect, I realize that as he met with my operations officer and company commanders I was seeing a mentor at his best. As a training plan was discussed, he made suggestions that would make the training more realistic. He questioned why they were performing a mission in a particular manner and caused them to come up with a more innovative way to accomplish the same task. Each question that he posed required the



officer to think out the requirement in order to answer. There never was a wrong answer, but the ones that were not doctrinally correct or well thought out, brought another question and gentle coaching by the general to reach the correct answer. Each time as he departed he provided the name of a new book to be added to the unit's professional library and used in the Officer Development Program. As he visited the battalion, whether in the field or at projects, he also spent time with the soldiers praising them for their good work and encouraging them to continue to excell. Throughout his tenure he maintained an outstanding command climate. Through his visits he did more to encourage soldiers to remember what it takes to win and why, than anyone else who visited the battalion. For fourteen months he did more to reinforce what a leader should be and do than I can ever thank him for. I have read about Generals Bradley and Ridgway and their leadership styles. This general obviously had taken their example to heart. Looking back, I tried to give my subordinate commanders, officers and NCO's the opportunity to function as I felt they would be required in conflict. During officer and NCO calls, I told them to be bold, decisive and innovative. Some of them took me to heart, but others failed because of their own timidity. I now wonder how they would respond to questions about those aspects of leadership which were encouraged during my command.

At the beginning of the War College year, I talked with some of my fellow students about their experiences in command. The discussions numbered about twenty and were not scientifically

conducted. The talks revolved around leadership and the command climate within the unit from which they came. I will relate these experiences by type of units, beginning with light infantry and Special Operations Forces to include Rangers and Special Forces. Of all the commanders, this first group was the one that seemed to have the best of everything. Mainly due to the missions and unit capabilities, these leaders were forced to live up to each of the leadership aspects listed in Chapter II. This group was unanimous in praising their supervisors for encouraging them to be bold, innovative, decisive and risk takers. They did not feel threatened at all by any grey areas, as I had. In order for their units to be successful, commanders had to live by these guidelines. Our recent incursion to Panama proves that this type of unit, and its leaders, have learned the secrets of success in the next battlefield. Consequently, I envy them for the way they were allowed to proceed during their commands.

A second grouping contained the heavier forces, mechanized infantry and armor. These officers knew what was required to win on the next battlefield, but were not always allowed to reach all their leadership goals. There were overriding factors which limited the way they did business on a regular basis. With tracked vehicles and tanks there is always the safety aspect to remember. They were to be realistic, but only to a point. Remember the fine line between good, solid training and poor judgment! Overall, I felt that these officers were not given precisely the same opportunities as those in the first group. They did however, know

what they had to do if they went to war, but they just were not always able to practice it.

The third group contained the combat support and combat service support commanders. These officers spoke of leadership and what will be required of commanders in war in a different voice than the others. Because of their missions, they were not encouraged to be bold in what they did. They had to be practical, but could be innovative. They had to support the warriors and ensure they could get the job done, but only in a proscribed manner. They were happy with the way events occurred. I believe that their feelings were a result of the way they were brought up in the Army. In any event, they obviously were successful in what they did, otherwise, they would not be at the War College today.

To look back now on what was encouraged in the field and what was not, is difficult. One's perspective changes depending on where he sits. I feel most of the warriors were moving in the right direction as leaders, being aware of what was necessary, and allowed to function that way. Others knew what was required of leaders, but were not always given the latitude to get there. The third group also knew, but felt that they did not have to function in that manner. They were clearly not required nor encouraged to move in that direction. It is apparent that we all are products of our growing environment in the Army and modelled after the leaders under whom we grew up professionally.

The April 1985 Report to the Officer Corps entitled: "Results of the Professional Development of Officers Study Surveys"

provides an interesting opinion. Of the 14,000 commissioned officers and 333 general officer respondents, 51 percent felt that a "bold, original, creative officer can survive." Conversely, 49 percent said that just the type of officer we need on the next battlefield will not survive. It is my sincere hope that the Army will not be tested again by fire to see if this is true. This could prove to be a real problem if all the warriors have been shown the door!

#### ENDNOTE

1. U.S. Department of the Army, Results of the Professional Development of Officers Study Surveys. p. 7 (hereafter referred to as "PDOS".)

## CHAPTER V

### HOW CAN SENIOR LEADERS EFFECT LEADERSHIP IN THE FUTURE?

Senior leaders in the Army today play a pivotal role in the makeup of the Army of the future. They are not only responsible for commanding the force today, writing doctrine for the future, but also for the very important task of developing tomorrow's leaders. The events that have occurred throughout the world since the beginning of the 1990 Army War College academic year have been staggering. With peace breaking out all throughout Europe and the apparent weakening of the threat posed by Russia and the WARSAW Pact, politicians want to spend the "peace dividend" today. As a result, the size of the Army over the next five years is very much in question. Figures of a 650,000, 600,000 or even 500,000 man Army by the end of FY 95 have been recently heard. The question of where American troops will be stationed has also been raised. The future is indeed very clouded. One fact, immediately clear, is that in the future smaller Army with reduced budgets and hardware, there will be a premium on the quality and ability of the leaders. The remainder of this chapter will examine what today's senior leaders can do and are required to do in order to prepare these future leaders.

Senior leaders receive their direction in how they are to influence leaders and soldiers from three main sources. They are FM 22-103: "Leadership and Command at Senior Levels," DA Pamphlet 600-80 and their own experiences. FM 22-103 provides its essential

guidance in Chapter I and builds upon this throughout the manual.

It reads:

"Leadership in peace and war demands senior leaders and commanders who are farsighted, flexible, and responsive. They look beyond peace to determine what their organizations need to be able to do for war, set the standards, and then train their units and soldiers accordingly. In the exercise of their duties, they -

- . Are first and foremost teachers and coaches to their organizations.
- . Develop technical and tactical competency.
- . Instill an organizational spirit to achieve and win.
- . Care deeply and use their leadership skills to serve their units and soldiers.
- . Safeguard the traditions of selfless service to the nation."

Senior leaders are also team builders and in order to have an effective team the senior leader must establish the proper conditions. Chapter 6 of FM 22-103 provides the conditions that the senior leader must put in place as:

- . Command intent
- . Command climate
- . Disciplined proficiency
- . Shared values and experiences
- . Focus on the future
- . Delegation."<sup>2</sup>

These are all self-explanatory conditions. However, command climate is critical and will be addressed later in the chapter. Chapter I, DA Pamphlet 600-80, provides a discussion on leader development that sets the stage for the entire document. Under this heading the three levels of leadership are discussed. As a part of the discussion an example of the what the level equates to

and some of the necessary leadership skills are provided. This framework also provides the leader of each level with a list of what he must do for subordinate leaders to ensure their growth professionally within the military. The following are extracts from the three levels, along with examples of where this level of leadership would be applied:

"Direct -battalion or TRADOC division

- coaching and teaching subordinates to develop technical and/or tactical proficiency in both individual and collective skills."<sup>3</sup>

"Indirect - division or commodity command

- creating combat power or productivity by integrating:
  - . tangibles (men, material and expendables)
  - . intangibles (intelligence, understanding of the senior leader's intent, and the command climate of the organization)
- mentoring, coaching, and teaching subordinate leaders, to provide a frame of reference both for learning direct skills and for upward growth."<sup>4</sup>

"Executive - joint task force, unified command positions

- creating policies and principles of operation so positive command climate and cohesion can be developed at lower echelons.
- "growing" subordinate leaders through mentoring and coaching."<sup>5</sup>

Once again, common themes run through each of these levels as requirements of senior leaders. Although all of the skills are not provided here (they may be reviewed in their entirety in DA PAM 600-80 pp. 4-6) the two that are common are mentoring and command climate.

In Chapter II, leadership and the doctrinal implications of leadership were examined. A list of thirteen aspects that I felt were required of combat leaders was compiled. As senior leaders,

how can we ensure our subordinates gain the right experience to be the next leaders of the Army? After reviewing the facts, I am sure that one necessary element is a good command climate. What is this command climate that is mentioned in both FM 22-103 and DA PAM 600-80? In an article entitled: "Leaders, Managers and Command Climate," LTG (Ret.) Walter Ulmer makes the following statement about command climate:

"and what is the essence of a "good climate" that promotes esprit and gives birth to "high performing units?" It is probably easier to feel or sense than to describe. It doesn't take long for most experienced people to take its measure. There is a pervasive sense of mission. There is a common agreement on what are the top priorities. There are clear standards. Competence is prized and appreciated. There is a willingness to share information. There is a sense of fair play. There is joy in teamwork. These are quick and convenient ways to attack nonsense and fix aberrations in the system. There is a sure sense of rationality and trust. The key to the climate is leadership in general, and senior leadership in particular."<sup>6</sup>

Understanding command climate, how do we bring it to a unit? Every action of a leader is watched by his subordinates. He is in a fishbowl. Once subordinates see that the leader's actions and words are the same, the proper command climate is achieved. They believe you when you say be innovative and take risks, because they know their mistakes will be underwritten. As this occurs, the unit will begin to come together more and more towards that high performance goal. When we follow the basic aspects of leadership identified in Chapter II, subordinate leaders will begin practicing them also.

Hand-in-hand with establishing the right command climate is the mentoring process which senior leaders must practice and ensure



is ongoing within units. What a mentor is and does is an area that deserves amplification:

"Mentoring is not instruction from the platform, briefing or SOPs. It is not shooting the bull like one of the guys. It is talking quietly and informally about the Army, about important professional concerns - the essence of our profession. It might involve suggested readings or even a written report, but the tone is always informal, the critique always gentle and the result always affirming."

Mentoring is done two levels down Lieutenant Colonels mentor lieutenants, colonels mentor captains and so on down the line. The mentoring process will help build the right command climate in the short term. More importantly, in the long term it will also produce better leaders throughout the Army. As I look back on my senior rater, discussed in Chapter IV, I realize that he was a mentor to both myself and my subordinate leaders without it being obvious to us. Even though I knew what a mentor was and did, I was still unaware the process was going on. Even more importantly, he brought with him the most positive command climate I have seen in over twenty years in the Army. He made sure everyone was aware of the command climate he expected as he talked and by his actions. Through his mentoring, the leaders of the battalion were better prepared for the next battlefield.

Having shown that both the right command climate and mentoring are important parts of the equation, how else can senior leaders emphasize the necessary aspects of leadership? Training of one's units and its members is vitally important to the quality of leaders produced. As senior leaders we are directed by FM 25-100,

"Training the Force" to employ the following "Principles of Training".<sup>3</sup>

- "1. Train as combined arms and service teams
2. Train as you fight
3. Use appropriate doctrine
4. Use performance-oriented training
5. Train to challenge
6. Train to sustain proficiency
7. Train using multiechelon techniques
8. Train to maintain
9. Make commanders the primary trainers."<sup>3</sup>

In my mind, numbers 2 through 5 of the principles listed above are the backbones and the others complement them. Both performance oriented training and challenging training further emphasize the critical aspects of leadership that the Army needs. The 1985 "Professional Development of Officers Study Survey (PDOS)," using input from the General Officer respondents, developed the "Fundamental Principles of Officer Professional and Leadership Development."<sup>4</sup> These principles "are based on the goal of the officer development system strengthening and fortifying the will, character, knowledge and skills of those who lead and support soldiers. Its fundamental principle is that officers develop a vision of the nature of future warfare, expect it, and prepare themselves and their subordinates to fight and win on the battlefield. It is the requirement to meet the demands of combat that defines the value of the officer corps."<sup>4</sup> Key to the development process according to PDOS is the premise that all officers:

- "a. Are professional
- b. Have a Warrior Spirit
- c. Progressively Master the Art and Science of Warfare
- d. Are Leaders

- e. Are Action Oriented in Their Thought Processes
- f. Develop a Broad Base of General Knowledge
- g. Are Patriots"--

Although "PDOS" looked solely at Officer development, for the purpose of this paper we must include Non-Commissioned Officers (NCO's) in the leader category also.

Returning to the premise that the Army will be considerably smaller in the future than it is today, selection and retention of good leaders becomes important. The decrease in overall size will have a direct impact on the numbers of leaders at all levels. The selection process will need tailoring to ensure that the Army chooses only the best soldiers for the officer and NCO ranks. Both the OER and the SEER evaluation systems have to be kept honest and uninflated. Senior leaders will have to be responsible, ensuring that their comments truly show a leader's worth and potential. This will be difficult, but must be done for the sake of the Army and its future.

To complete the process of growing and maintaining our leaders, there must be a clear progression and career opportunities for them. The events of today, including Reduction in Forces, Selective Early Retirement Boards, and forced early outs for junior officers do not encourage people to remain in the Army. In fact, one may suggest that the best and brightest, the ones we truly want to retain, will cross over to the civilian sector. If this happens, the ones left behind may be harder to bring up to the standards the future will require. This aspect will require close

watching to ensure the Army does not severely damage itself during the transition.

While studying the great leaders in the past and determining what would be required of leaders in the future, one thought comes to mind. Weapons and doctrine have changed over time, but not leadership. The same determination to be a good leader that succeeded in the past will also succeed in the future. As senior leaders we must pass this message to our subordinates. We also must ensure they fully understand the requirements of being a leader in the profession of arms.

The Army must continue to take units to the National Training Center and the Joint Readiness Training Center. The senior leadership must use these exercises to allow subordinate leaders to practice the critical aspects of leadership identified. Make training and exercises as realistic and demanding as possible to introduce some of the friction and fog of war into them. A commander's efficiency report should not be based solely on his unit's performance at the training center. It should be taken into consideration, but not the driving force. If senior leaders can remember and implement this philosophy, then we will develop the type of leaders the Army really needs.

After looking at doctrine, history and what is occurring in the present, my thoughts have come full circle. When I began I was sure I would find the system wanting. Instead, I find it is alive and well, merely in need of fine-tuning. Leaders in the Army today have been taught the elements of leadership they need to know in

schools and on the job each day. It is up to the senior leaders to follow the manuals written for them to ensure the next generation of leaders are every bit as good, or better, than they are. This knowledge has come from hard work, study and suffering under some who believe in different approaches. I feel they are doing a good job for the most part. There are some who need to work harder, but overall, it is going well. The same aspects of leadership apply both in combat and in the peacetime Army. In war, when led properly, soldiers stay alive. During peacetime we keep them motivated, well-trained and prepared to go to war. Each leader has a sworn obligation to take care of his soldiers. These soldiers are one of this nation's most important parts of deterrence.

In closing, I found that General Bruce C. Clarke left as a small portion of his legacy some rules of leadership which summarize what all leaders must do, particularly senior leaders:

- "1. That their honest errors be pointed out but be underwritten at least once in the interests of developing initiative and leadership.
2. To be responsible for and be allowed to develop their own units with only the essential guidance from above.
3. A helpful attitude toward their problems.
4. Loyalty.
5. That they not be subjected to the needling of unproductive "statistics" competitions between like units.
6. The best in commandership.
7. That the needs of their units be anticipated and provided for.
8. To be kept oriented as to the missions and situation in the unit above.
9. A well-thought-out program of training, work, and recreation.

10. To receive timely, clear-cut, and positive orders and decisions which are constantly changed.
11. That the integrity of their tactical units be maintained in assigning essential tasks.
12. That their success be measured by the overall ability of a unit to perform its whole mission and not by the performance of one or two factors.
13. That good works by their units be recognized and rewarded in such ways as to motivate the greatest number to do well and to seek further improvement."<sup>3</sup>

#### ENDNOTES

1. FM 22-103, p. 4.
2. Ibid., p. 61.
3. U.S. Department of the Army, Pamphlet 600-80, p. 5 (hereafter referred to as "DA PAM 600-80").
4. Ibid.
5. Ibid., p. 6.
6. Walter Ulmer, "Leaders, Managers and Command Climate," Armed Forces Journal International, July 1986.
7. LTC Larry H. Ingram, "Caring is not Enough - An Uninvited Talk to Army Leaders," Military Review, December 1987, p. 47.
8. U.S. Department of the Army, Field Manual 25-100, p. 1-3 (hereafter referred to as "FM 25-100").
9. Ibid., p. 1-3, 1-5.
10. PDOS., p. 18.
11. Ibid.
12. Ibid., pp. 18-19.
13. FM 22-103, inside cover.

## CHAPTER VI

### CONCLUSIONS

Studying and reviewing leadership to determine if there is a difference between leadership in peace and war, as well as how senior leaders can make a positive effect on leaders, has been extremely enlightening. When I began this paper I had a preconceived notion there would be a considerable difference and that it would be easy to define. My lack of actual combat experience added to my thought there would be a difference. As my research began to take shape, one continuing fact came to light. This was although leadership in combat was discussed, there never was any difference noted between leadership in war and peace. I really did not believe this at first, but as the facts continued to mount it became harder to dismiss.

FM 22-103 states right in Chapter I:

"In this sense, the concepts discussed in this manual make no distinction in applicability for peace or war. They apply in all circumstances and to all large organizations at the tactical and operational levels. There will be little time to learn new skills or adapt once a conflict begins. The way those in senior positions approach the training of their units in peace will be the way units operate in war. The way resources are managed in peace will be the way they are allocated in war. The involvement of senior leaders on the administrative and training battlefield will determine the manner of their presence on the combat battlefield."

To me this summarizes the majority of what I discovered during this project. Leadership is leadership, war or peace. A leader may emphasize a different aspect due to the nature of combat, but the essentials always remain the same. Washington, Patton, Eisenhower,

Bradley and Ridgway all followed the same principles of leadership in getting their mission done. Their personalities were different and may have flavored their style, but they used the same basic leadership skills.

A key question that I felt also needed to be answered was, how would a dwindling population of combat veterans affect the Army's capability in war? This year's Lieutenant Colonel command list probably will not have any veterans of the Vietnam War on it. In two years, when their commands are completed, these officers will be attending the War Colleges. This year's Colonel command list had individuals on it who have no combat experience. It would not be surprising if, in the next three to five years, the first general officers will be selected in recent history without combat experience. Will this be a problem for the Army? I really do not think it will for three main reasons. The first I stated before. There is no real difference between leadership in peace and war. Therefore, a good leader in peace should be a good leader in war. The second is that history has shown that the United States Army has always found very good leaders in its ranks when wars begin and they rise to the top to ensure we win. It happened in World Wars I and II, Korea and Vietnam. Each time leaders were developed and met the challenge. My final reason is that our present and future senior leaders have learned what is necessary to help subordinate leaders excel. They are mentoring, providing excellent command climates and underwriting subordinates honest mistakes. This is key to the successes of future leaders. Our present senior leaders



understand this and are making it a way of life in the field. There are exceptions, but I feel they are in the minority.

As I began this project I was afraid I would find the system broken and be unable to provide a realistic fix. Instead, I found the system healthy. There is always room for improvement in any system, but our leadership system is very sound. As senior leaders we have requirements to fulfill and a legacy to leave behind. Our legacy must be properly trained, motivated and confident leaders who are prepared to succeed in any environment. The tools are available to us today. If we use them properly, future leaders will be ready to step forward and march to the sounds of the guns, if necessary. The future Pattons, Marshalls, MacArthurs are in the Army today. Train them, nurture them and they will be ready when the time comes. If we accomplish this, then our most precious resource in the Army today, soldiers, will be well trained, led and capable of surviving on the next battlefield.

#### ENDNOTE

1. FM 22-103, p. 4.

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